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David Chalmers, the “hard” and “soft” problems of consciousness, and could I be a zombie and not know it?

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This article is by a person who disagrees with David Chalmers, but it happens to have a good summary of what David Chalmers had to say.

The consciousness debate is often formulated in terms used in an influential talk given by a young David Chalmers in Tucson in 1994. Chalmers, a philosopher, distinguished two separate “problems of consciousness.” The first is the very hard problem described above: understanding the processes in the brain that give rise to the many aspects of our visible behavior and our inner behavior that we can report about. Chalmers christened this hard problem as the “easy” problem of consciousness. 

Then he declared that there is another distinct problem — why the brain’s behavior is accompanied by experience at all — which he christened the “hard” problem of consciousness. Today, this so-called “hard problem” is mentioned in all debates on consciousness. According to many, it unveils the very limits of current scientific understanding. Chalmers claimed that even after hypothetically accounting for our entire behavior, and for all our reports about our inner life, there would still be an “explanatory gap” between brain processes and experience…

Chalmers asks us to contemplate what he calls a “philosophical zombie.” This is a hypothetical entity that looks and behaves like a human in all respects, including reporting emotions, feelings, dreams and experience, yet it has no consciousness. As Chalmers puts it, “There is nobody home.” This is a rhetorical trick that induces us to distinguish between behavior and a hypothetical reality accessible only by introspection. The very fact that a philosophical zombie could be conceived, Chalmers argues, shows that inner experience is intrinsically distinct from observable natural phenomena. 

The article has a link to a video of Chalmers’s original lecture, for people who have time to watch videos. Such people must either not have jobs, houses or children, or else their jobs, houses and children must be less demanding of time and attention than mine, or maybe they are wealthy enough to pay other people to deal with their houses and children while they do their jobs (but this raises some questions of priorities, in my view.

Big-C and Little-C Consciousness

This article in KurzweilAI explains the competing “Big C” and “Little C” theories of consciousness.

Another viewpoint on consciousness comes from quantum theory, which is the deepest theory of physics. According to the orthodox Copenhagen Interpretation, consciousness and the physical world are complementary aspects of the same reality. When a person observes, or experiments on, some aspect of the physical world, that person’s conscious interaction causes discernible change. Since it takes consciousness as a given and no attempt is made to derive it from physics, the Copenhagen Interpretation may be called the “big-C” view of consciousness, where it is a thing that exists by itself – although it requires brains to become real. This view was popular with the pioneers of quantum theory such as Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schrödinger.

The interaction between consciousness and matter leads to paradoxes that remain unresolved after 80 years of debate. A well-known example of this is the paradox of Schrödinger’s cat, in which a cat is placed in a situation that results in it being equally likely to survive or die – and the act of observation itself is what makes the outcome certain.

The opposing view is that consciousness emerges from biology, just as biology itself emerges from chemistry which, in turn, emerges from physics. We call this less expansive concept of consciousness “little-C.” It agrees with the neuroscientists’ view that the processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. It also agrees with a more recent interpretation of quantum theory motivated by an attempt to rid it of paradoxes, the Many Worlds Interpretation, in which observers are a part of the mathematics of physics.